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part: the other is called roaaxr}, as muche to saye, as the finding parte .5
Then amain) itself falls typically into three parts, which Lever calls; 1 words, 2 sayings, or sentences, 3 reasons. Since Lever discusses only the true and not false reasonings, his work thus naturally falls into four books.
Robert Sanderson in 1615 connects these divisions with their Aristotelian sources.
Ejus [logicae] tres sunt partes, pro numero actuum mentis ab e, dirigibilium: quarum Prima dirigit primum actum Mentis, sc. Conceptum simplicem; & est de Simplicibus terminis: qu8 pertinent introductio Porphyriana, & Liber Categoriarum Aristotelis.
Secunda dirigit secundum actum Mentis, sc. Compositionem & Divisionem; & est de Propositione: quo spectat Liber de Interpretatione.
Tertia dirigit tertium & vltimum Metis actum, sc. Discursum, & est de llrgumentatione & Methodo: qu$ spectant Anatyticorum Priorum libri duo, totidemq; posteriorum, octo Topicorum, Elenchorum detain duo!
Thus Sanderson groups Lever's reasons and topics together as a third book, instead of making two books out of them as Lever had done.
Seton in 1545 had used the division which Lever later followed. Wilson in 1551 had followed the same order as Seton, but adding a section on false reasons.
Hetherto we haue treated of the former parte of logique called in latine luditium, that is to saye, ludgement, or skill, to declare the nature of euerye worde seuerallie, to set the same wordes in a perfecte sentence, and to knitte them vp in argument, so that hereby we rnyght with ease espie, the ryght frame in matters, howe they agree beyng lapped vp in order. Nowe therefore the other parte shalbe sette forth whiche is called Inuentio, where-by we maie finde argumentes, and reasons, mete to proue eucry matter where vpon question maie ryse. This parte is the store house of places wherin argumentes rest .5
Nowe that I haue declared, what an argumeet is, what the places of inuencion bee, how thei serve for the confirmacion of any matter, howe euery thyng is made, in his due mode, and figure, and also shewed the obseruacio of many thynges, wherby any one, shall bothe be assured, that his argument is true, (if it be made accordyng to the rules) & also may know that it is false, if it be not made accordyng to the same rules : I wil fro hence furthe, set out the maner of deceiptfull argumentes, called in Latine, reprehensiones, or fa/laces conclusiunculae, euen as Aristotle hath set the furth.5
R Lever, R., The ~4rte of Reason, rightly termed, Witcraft (1573, copy in University of Illinois Library), p. 138.
* Sanderson, Robert, Logicae rlrtis Compendivm (Oxford, t818, personal), pp. 2-3. This second edition is the earliest that I have seen.
s Wilson, Reason (1551), p. 14V. 4 Wilson, Reason {1351), p. P4v.
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